Mali’s Unholy Alliance: A Recipe for Disaster in the Sahel

The conflict in northern Mali has long been a complex web of insurgency, separatism, and terrorism. The recent partnership between the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, has taken the war to a new and perilous level.

This alliance is not just a pragmatic response to shared battlefield interests; it’s a calculated risk that could have far-reaching implications for security across the Sahel. The FLA, once a secular nationalist movement seeking independence for Azawad, now finds itself in bed with an extremist group that seeks to impose its own brand of Islamic law on Mali.

The partnership is rooted in the failure of successive peace agreements and the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement. This agreement aimed to address the grievances of northern armed groups through decentralization and political representation but ultimately faltered due to Bamako’s inability to honor its commitments.

The Power Play

The FLA-JNIM alliance has altered the military dynamics on the ground, with both sides sharing battlefield expertise and coordinating attacks on military bases and supply convoys. Simultaneous attacks across distant locations have become more common, and engagements lasting several days are increasingly frequent. This new partnership has introduced a level of sophistication to the conflict.

The FLA’s senior officer, Colonel Mohamed Issa, insists that the movement remains committed to independence for Azawad, while JNIM sees this partnership as part of a broader campaign to “liberate” Mali from what it perceives as illegitimate rule. The relationship between the two groups appears to be driven by a desire to confront a common enemy: the Malian state and its Russian-backed forces.

A Shifting Balance of Power

The alliance has also reshaped the way the war is fought, with drones assuming an increasingly prominent role in reconnaissance and strikes. Both sides are now relying on air power to gain an upper hand. However, months of sustained fighting suggest that neither side has secured a decisive advantage.

Financing and trafficking networks continue to sustain both sides, with JNIM sources describing these networks as “relatively unified,” suggesting a level of coordination between the two groups. These networks have been long established and continue to fuel the conflict.

The Sahel’s Fragile Stability

The implications of this alliance go beyond Mali’s borders. The Sahel region is already reeling from the aftermath of terrorist attacks, and this partnership has set off alarm bells across West Africa. ECOWAS has suspended Mali and imposed sanctions in response to the military coup that followed, while Russia deepened its military role by deploying the Wagner Group in 2021.

The question now is whether this alliance will hold as the conflict evolves. Will shared battlefield interests continue to outweigh ideological differences? Or will the inherent contradictions between the FLA’s nationalist goals and JNIM’s extremist ideology eventually tear them apart?

A Recipe for Disaster

This partnership has set a perilous precedent for security in the Sahel, emboldening extremist groups across West Africa and further destabilizing the region. If allowed to continue, it could have far-reaching consequences.

The international community must take heed of this development and reevaluate its approach to conflict resolution in Mali. The war economy, fueled by trafficking networks and external financing, needs to be dismantled. Bamako’s inability to honor peace agreements and address the grievances of northern armed groups must be addressed through a more inclusive and sustainable political process.

The future of stability in the Sahel hangs precariously in the balance. It is imperative that policymakers recognize the danger posed by this alliance and act swiftly to prevent its spread across the region.